Top-level docs were stale and the .gitea/ issue templates referenced a
workflow that is no longer in use.
- README: rewrite around the current feature set (SLM routing, profiles,
plugin TOFU, SafeProvider boundary, current model defaults). Add a
pre-built-binary install section plus Docker (ghcr.io) install path
for users without a Go toolchain. Document the GitHub mirror.
- CONTRIBUTING: drop the dead issue-template reference, note Gitea
upstream + GitHub mirror split, expand the package map and test-target
table.
- AGENTS: rebuild as a domain glossary (Elf / Arm / Turn / SafeProvider /
Incognito / Profile) plus non-obvious conventions an outside agent
needs and would not infer from the code.
- TODO: trim completed waves into a History section, fix a broken
link to the never-written Wave 3 plan file, surface active backlog.
- docs/essentials/INDEX: add ADR-004 (PostToolUse hook ordering) to the
ADR list.
- LICENSE + NOTICE: adopt Apache License 2.0. Patent grant matters
because gnoma bundles SDKs from Anthropic / OpenAI / Google / Mistral
and ships derivative tooling that runs untrusted MCP servers.
- Delete .gitea/issue_template/ and gemma-integration-analysis.md
(latter is obsolete per its own preamble — Node.js-specific notes
that don't apply to the Go implementation).
Plugins are now verified against ~/.config/gnoma/plugins.pins.toml at
load time. Each plugin's plugin.json bytes are hashed (SHA-256) and:
- recorded automatically on first load (TOFU) with a prominent warning
- compared on subsequent loads
- refused with a clear error if the hash drifted, without overwriting
the pin so the user can review and re-enrol deliberately
Pin-store I/O failures degrade to load-without-pinning rather than
locking the user out of previously-trusted plugins.
Closes audit finding C2. See ADR-003 for the decision rationale and
docs/plugins-trust.md for the end-user trust model.