Plugins are now verified against ~/.config/gnoma/plugins.pins.toml at
load time. Each plugin's plugin.json bytes are hashed (SHA-256) and:
- recorded automatically on first load (TOFU) with a prominent warning
- compared on subsequent loads
- refused with a clear error if the hash drifted, without overwriting
the pin so the user can review and re-enrol deliberately
Pin-store I/O failures degrade to load-without-pinning rather than
locking the user out of previously-trusted plugins.
Closes audit finding C2. See ADR-003 for the decision rationale and
docs/plugins-trust.md for the end-user trust model.
- Fix append footgun: allHooks/allMCPServers allocated fresh to avoid
mutating cfg's backing array (lines 391/413 in main.go)
- Fix pipe-mode permission prompt: detect no-TTY stdin and auto-deny
instead of blocking forever on fmt.Scanln EOF
- Tighten Mistral API key regex from bare [a-zA-Z0-9]{32} (matched
commit hashes, UUIDs) to context-gated pattern requiring "mistral"
keyword nearby. Added scanner test for positives and negatives.
- Remove README demo GIF TODO placeholder
- Unify version string: pass buildVersion from ldflags into tui.Config
instead of hardcoding "v0.1.0-dev"
- Populate benchmarks doc with actual Go benchmark results