Plugins are now verified against ~/.config/gnoma/plugins.pins.toml at
load time. Each plugin's plugin.json bytes are hashed (SHA-256) and:
- recorded automatically on first load (TOFU) with a prominent warning
- compared on subsequent loads
- refused with a clear error if the hash drifted, without overwriting
the pin so the user can review and re-enrol deliberately
Pin-store I/O failures degrade to load-without-pinning rather than
locking the user out of previously-trusted plugins.
Closes audit finding C2. See ADR-003 for the decision rationale and
docs/plugins-trust.md for the end-user trust model.
Complete the remaining M8 extensibility deliverables:
- MCP client with JSON-RPC 2.0 over stdio transport, protocol
lifecycle (initialize/tools-list/tools-call), and process group
management for clean shutdown
- MCP tool adapter implementing tool.Tool with mcp__{server}__{tool}
naming convention and replace_default for swapping built-in tools
- MCP manager for multi-server orchestration with parallel startup,
tool discovery, and registry integration
- Plugin system with plugin.json manifest (name/version/capabilities),
directory-based discovery (global + project scopes with precedence),
loader that merges skills/hooks/MCP configs into existing registries,
and install/uninstall/list lifecycle manager
- Config additions: MCPServerConfig, PluginsSection with opt-in/opt-out
enabled/disabled resolution
- TUI /plugins command for listing installed plugins
- 54 tests across internal/mcp and internal/plugin packages
vikingowl