The 'What makes gnoma different' bullet and Security section both implied a network-egress firewall. Today the Firewall only enforces a content boundary (secret scan, Unicode sanitize, redact/block). Reword both spots and add a Scope note. Surface the gap as a top-of-TODO entry covering per-session audit log and per-host egress allowlist, with the open design question (host-level vs per-tool) called out. Raised via r/SideProject v0.3.0 launch thread.
6.3 KiB
Gnoma — TODO
Active work, newest first.
In flight
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Security boundary — egress controls + session audit log. The current
Firewallis a content boundary only (scans messages and tool results for secrets via regex + Shannon entropy, redacts or blocks, logs vialog/slog). It does not enforce network egress — outgoing HTTP from tools and providers uses stockhttp.Clientwith no per-host allowlist or dial-layer interception. Two follow- ups surfaced from the r/SideProject v0.3.0 launch thread (2026-05-24,u/Secret_Theme3192):- Per-session audit log of blocked/redacted events —
grep-able file at
.gnoma/sessions/<id>/audit.jsonlso the user can answer "what did the firewall do this session?" in one command. Today theslogoutput goes to whatever sink is configured, with no per-session grouping. - Per-host egress allowlist (HTTP transport layer) — open
design question: host-level (
allow api.openai.com, deny *) vs per-tool (bash can only hit these hosts). Reply asked the commenter for their mental model; revisit when feedback lands. The README and v0.3.0 Reddit post phrasing oversold "network egress gated"; corrected in the same commit as this TODO entry.
- Per-session audit log of blocked/redacted events —
grep-able file at
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Tool-router specialization (functiongemma) — gated on telemetry, not committed. Phase A.2 adds did-switch-rate measurement to the two-stage
select_categorypath; Phase A.3 (LoRA fine-tune offunctiongemma-270m-itas a dedicatedArmRoleToolRouter) only fires if did-switch rate exceeds 20 %. Three independent external reviews consulted 2026-05-23; consensus is "fits as tool-call router, not chat; fine-tuning mandatory; prove the need first." Seedocs/superpowers/plans/2026-05-23-tool-router-specialization.md. -
Entropy FP reduction (post-SLM Phase F) — F-1 (format-aware pre-extractor) shipped 2026-05-22:
[security].entropy_safelistwithuuid,sha_hex,iso8601,url; default empty so pre-F-1 behaviour is unchanged. F-2 (SLM-assisted classifier for ambiguous entropy hits) remains gated on F-1 FP-rate telemetry from real workloads plus ≥50 SLM observations. Surfaced from the r/ollama launch thread (2026-05-20); external validation from alterlab.io on the same tiered approach. Seedocs/superpowers/plans/2026-05-19-post-slm-unlock.md. -
Compound tools (post-SLM Phase E) — held until ≥50 SLM observations inform which primitives are worth adding. See
docs/superpowers/plans/2026-05-19-post-slm-unlock.md. -
Sensitive-content handling — unified policy. Three input paths can introduce sensitive content into the context: pasted images (screenshots may contain secrets, API keys, PII), pasted text (often copied straight from a terminal with credentials), and tool-read files (
.env, key files, etc.). Today these are handled inconsistently: incognito gates persistence but content still flows to providers; outgoing-scan firewall covers some patterns but is format-aware only for text. Need a single policy/UI: at-paste warning when the content matches sensitive heuristics, a consent-gated review step, and consistent treatment across the three paths. Cross-cuts with Phase F entropy work and the outgoing-scan firewall. -
Distribution — follow-ups. v0.1.0 shipped (archives on github.com/VikingOwl91/gnoma/releases, multi-arch images on ghcr.io/vikingowl91/gnoma). Still optional: Homebrew tap,
curl | shinstaller script, signed checksums (cosign/sigstore), release note automation, Windows process-tree kill via golang.org/x/sys/windows job objects (currentlyos.Process.Killonly — seeinternal/mcp/transport_windows.go), and migration fromdockers+docker_manifeststodockers_v2in.goreleaser.yml(collapses ~45 lines into one block but requires Dockerfile changes for the per-platform binary layout — deferred to its own commit before v0.3.0).
Stable backlog (not in active phases)
- Thinking mode (disabled / budget / adaptive) — M12.
- Structured output with JSON schema validation — M12.
- Native agy JSON output — switch the subprocess provider to
--output-format stream-jsononce the agy CLI supports it, replacing the current prompt-augmentation fallback. - SQLite session persistence + serve mode — M10.
- Task learning (pattern recognition, persistent tasks) — M11.
- Web UI (
gnoma web) — M15. - OAuth / keyring — M13.
- Observability (feature flags, cost dashboards) — M14.
- PE / Mach-O ELF support — future, after ELF Phase 6.
History
Completed initiatives, kept here as pointers to their plan files:
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v0.1.0 release — 2026-05-20. First tagged release. GoReleaser pipeline produces six static archives (linux/darwin/windows × amd64/arm64) on the GitHub mirror plus multi-arch Docker images on GHCR. History was rewritten on the same day to migrate authorship to a noreply identity and strip co-author attribution.
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Post-audit security hardening — complete 2026-05-19. Three waves
- one ADR closed all 14 findings from the external review:
- Wave 1 — SafeProvider boundary
- Wave 2 — Incognito coherence
- Wave 3 — scanner + path hygiene (rolled out directly without a
plan file; see commits leading up to 2026-05-19 on
internal/security) - ADR-004 — PostToolUse hook ordering
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Post-SLM unlock — plan. Phases A–D complete (two-stage tool routing, CLI agent binary override, user profiles, per-arm capability tags).
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2026-05-07 roadmap — plan. M1–M8 done; SLM classifier (Phase 3) complete; Phase 4 superseded by the post-SLM plan.
Reference
- Milestones:
docs/essentials/milestones.md - Decisions:
docs/essentials/decisions/ - ADR-002 (SLM routing, supersedes earlier ADR-009):
docs/essentials/decisions/002-slm-routing.md