Files
gnoma/internal/tool/agent/coordinator_test.go
T
vikingowl 34f6f1c786 feat(security): incognito coherence across firewall/router/persist (Wave 2)
Closes the cluster of audit findings where gnoma's incognito promise
('no persistence, no learning, local-only routing') silently broke
because state was duplicated across the CLI flag, the firewall's
IncognitoMode, the router's localOnly flag, and the TUI's local
m.incognito field. Wave 2 makes security.IncognitoMode the canonical
source of truth.

W2-1 Router.Select rejects forced non-local arms when localOnly is on
  rather than short-circuiting and silently routing to cloud. Main
  fails fast when --incognito + --provider <cloud> are combined; the
  TUI toggle (Ctrl+X, /incognito, config panel) refuses with an
  actionable message when a non-local arm is pinned. Factored the
  three duplicated toggle sites into Model.attemptIncognitoToggle.

W2-2 persist.Store.Save consults an IncognitoGate (local interface,
  *security.IncognitoMode satisfies it). nil gate = always persist
  (legacy behaviour for tests); non-nil gate is consulted on every
  Save so TUI runtime toggles take effect without reconstructing the
  store. File mode 0o600, dir mode 0o700.

W2-3 tui.New seeds m.incognito from cfg.Firewall.Incognito().Active().
  Fixes the Ctrl+X-on-launch-with-incognito case where the first
  toggle silently turned the firewall OFF because the local flag
  started false out of sync with the firewall.

W2-4 saveQuality gates on both *incognito (defensive, covers the
  window before fwRef.Set fires) and fw.Incognito().ShouldLearn() (so
  TUI Ctrl+X suppresses the snapshot on exit). Quality restore skipped
  under --incognito. Quality file written 0o600 in dir 0o700.
  engine.reportOutcome and elf.Manager.ReportResult both gate on
  fw.Incognito().ShouldLearn() — bandit signal no longer leaks out of
  incognito sessions.

W2-5 session files written 0o600 in dirs 0o700 (was 0o644 / 0o755).

W2-6 IncognitoMode.LocalOnly dropped — dead field with no readers;
  routing local-only state lives on the router, not the firewall.

Also wires rtr.SetLocalOnly(true) when --incognito at launch — main
previously activated the firewall's flag but never told the router to
filter, so even without the forced-arm bug, launching with
--incognito alone gave you 'incognito badge but full arm pool'.
2026-05-19 22:57:36 +02:00

104 lines
3.0 KiB
Go

package agent_test
import (
"context"
"encoding/json"
"os"
"strings"
"testing"
"somegit.dev/Owlibou/gnoma/internal/tool/agent"
"somegit.dev/Owlibou/gnoma/internal/tool/persist"
)
func makeTestStore(t *testing.T) *persist.Store {
t.Helper()
s := persist.New("test-coord-"+t.Name(), nil)
t.Cleanup(func() { _ = os.RemoveAll(s.Dir()) })
return s
}
func TestListResultsTool_EmptyStore(t *testing.T) {
s := makeTestStore(t)
tool := agent.NewListResultsTool(s)
args, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]string{})
result, err := tool.Execute(context.Background(), args)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
// Empty store: either a "no results" message or empty output is acceptable;
// verify only that we don't surface a hard error.
if strings.Contains(result.Output, "error") {
t.Errorf("unexpected error output for empty store: %s", result.Output)
}
}
func TestListResultsTool_ListsFiles(t *testing.T) {
s := makeTestStore(t)
big := strings.Repeat("x", 1024)
s.Save("bash", "toolu_aaa", big)
s.Save("fs.grep", "toolu_bbb", big)
tool := agent.NewListResultsTool(s)
args, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]string{})
result, err := tool.Execute(context.Background(), args)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if !strings.Contains(result.Output, "bash") {
t.Errorf("expected bash in output, got: %s", result.Output)
}
if !strings.Contains(result.Output, "fs") {
t.Errorf("expected fs in output, got: %s", result.Output)
}
}
func TestListResultsTool_FilterByToolName(t *testing.T) {
s := makeTestStore(t)
big := strings.Repeat("x", 1024)
s.Save("bash", "toolu_c1", big)
s.Save("fs.read", "toolu_c2", big)
tool := agent.NewListResultsTool(s)
args, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]string{"filter": "bash"})
result, err := tool.Execute(context.Background(), args)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if !strings.Contains(result.Output, "bash") {
t.Errorf("filter should include bash, got: %s", result.Output)
}
if strings.Contains(result.Output, "fs") {
t.Errorf("filter should exclude fs.read, got: %s", result.Output)
}
}
func TestReadResultTool_ReadsFile(t *testing.T) {
s := makeTestStore(t)
big := strings.Repeat("hello\n", 200)
path, _ := s.Save("bash", "toolu_read1", big)
tool := agent.NewReadResultTool(s)
args, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]string{"path": path})
result, err := tool.Execute(context.Background(), args)
if err != nil {
t.Fatal(err)
}
if !strings.Contains(result.Output, "hello") {
t.Errorf("expected file content in output, got: %s", result.Output)
}
}
func TestReadResultTool_RejectsPathTraversal(t *testing.T) {
s := makeTestStore(t)
tool := agent.NewReadResultTool(s)
args, _ := json.Marshal(map[string]string{"path": "/etc/passwd"})
result, err := tool.Execute(context.Background(), args)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Execute must not return a hard error; soft rejection in Output expected, got: %v", err)
}
if !strings.Contains(result.Output, "outside") {
t.Errorf("expected 'outside session directory' rejection, got: %s", result.Output)
}
}