vikingowl
0728262a9e
BREAKING CHANGES: - owlen-core no longer depends on ratatui/crossterm - RemoteMcpClient constructors are now async - MCP path validation is stricter (security hardening) This commit resolves three critical issues identified in project analysis: ## P0-1: Extract TUI dependencies from owlen-core Create owlen-ui-common crate to hold UI-agnostic color and theme abstractions, removing architectural boundary violation. Changes: - Create new owlen-ui-common crate with abstract Color enum - Move theme.rs from owlen-core to owlen-ui-common - Define Color with Rgb and Named variants (no ratatui dependency) - Create color conversion layer in owlen-tui (color_convert.rs) - Update 35+ color usages with conversion wrappers - Remove ratatui/crossterm from owlen-core dependencies Benefits: - owlen-core usable in headless/CLI contexts - Enables future GUI frontends - Reduces binary size for core library consumers ## P0-2: Fix blocking WebSocket connections Convert RemoteMcpClient constructors to async, eliminating runtime blocking that froze TUI for 30+ seconds on slow connections. Changes: - Make new_with_runtime(), new_with_config(), new() async - Remove block_in_place wrappers for I/O operations - Add 30-second connection timeout with tokio::time::timeout - Update 15+ call sites across 10 files to await constructors - Convert 4 test functions to #[tokio::test] Benefits: - TUI remains responsive during WebSocket connections - Proper async I/O follows Rust best practices - No more indefinite hangs ## P1-1: Secure path traversal vulnerabilities Implement comprehensive path validation with 7 defense layers to prevent file access outside workspace boundaries. Changes: - Create validate_safe_path() with multi-layer security: * URL decoding (prevents %2E%2E bypasses) * Absolute path rejection * Null byte protection * Windows-specific checks (UNC/device paths) * Lexical path cleaning (removes .. components) * Symlink resolution via canonicalization * Boundary verification with starts_with check - Update 4 MCP resource functions (get/list/write/delete) - Add 11 comprehensive security tests Benefits: - Blocks URL-encoded, absolute, UNC path attacks - Prevents null byte injection - Stops symlink escape attempts - Cross-platform security (Windows/Linux/macOS) ## Test Results - owlen-core: 109/109 tests pass (100%) - owlen-tui: 52/53 tests pass (98%, 1 pre-existing failure) - owlen-providers: 2/2 tests pass (100%) - Build: cargo build --all succeeds ## Verification - ✓ cargo tree -p owlen-core shows no TUI dependencies - ✓ No block_in_place calls remain in MCP I/O code - ✓ All 11 security tests pass Fixes: #P0-1, #P0-2, #P1-1 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
68 lines
2.4 KiB
Rust
68 lines
2.4 KiB
Rust
use owlen_core::McpToolCall;
|
|
use owlen_core::mcp::remote_client::RemoteMcpClient;
|
|
use tempfile::tempdir;
|
|
|
|
#[tokio::test]
|
|
async fn remote_write_and_delete() {
|
|
// Build the server binary first
|
|
let status = std::process::Command::new("cargo")
|
|
.args(["build", "-p", "owlen-mcp-server"])
|
|
.status()
|
|
.expect("failed to build MCP server");
|
|
assert!(status.success());
|
|
|
|
// Use a temp dir as project root
|
|
let dir = tempdir().expect("tempdir");
|
|
std::env::set_current_dir(dir.path()).expect("set cwd");
|
|
|
|
let client = RemoteMcpClient::new().await.expect("client init");
|
|
|
|
// Write a file via MCP
|
|
let write_call = McpToolCall {
|
|
name: "resources_write".to_string(),
|
|
arguments: serde_json::json!({ "path": "test.txt", "content": "hello" }),
|
|
};
|
|
client.call_tool(write_call).await.expect("write tool");
|
|
|
|
// Verify content via local read (fallback check)
|
|
let content = std::fs::read_to_string(dir.path().join("test.txt")).expect("read back");
|
|
assert_eq!(content, "hello");
|
|
|
|
// Delete the file via MCP
|
|
let del_call = McpToolCall {
|
|
name: "resources_delete".to_string(),
|
|
arguments: serde_json::json!({ "path": "test.txt" }),
|
|
};
|
|
client.call_tool(del_call).await.expect("delete tool");
|
|
assert!(!dir.path().join("test.txt").exists());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[tokio::test]
|
|
async fn write_outside_root_is_rejected() {
|
|
// Build server (already built in previous test, but ensure it exists)
|
|
let status = std::process::Command::new("cargo")
|
|
.args(["build", "-p", "owlen-mcp-server"])
|
|
.status()
|
|
.expect("failed to build MCP server");
|
|
assert!(status.success());
|
|
|
|
// Set cwd to a fresh temp dir
|
|
let dir = tempdir().expect("tempdir");
|
|
std::env::set_current_dir(dir.path()).expect("set cwd");
|
|
let client = RemoteMcpClient::new().await.expect("client init");
|
|
|
|
// Attempt to write outside the root using "../evil.txt"
|
|
let call = McpToolCall {
|
|
name: "resources_write".to_string(),
|
|
arguments: serde_json::json!({ "path": "../evil.txt", "content": "bad" }),
|
|
};
|
|
let err = client.call_tool(call).await.unwrap_err();
|
|
// The server returns a Network error with path traversal message
|
|
let err_str = format!("{err}");
|
|
assert!(
|
|
err_str.contains("path traversal") || err_str.contains("Path traversal"),
|
|
"Expected path traversal error, got: {}",
|
|
err_str
|
|
);
|
|
}
|