Implements the remediation pass described in
planning/19-security-audit-2026-04-30.md. All Critical findings and the
Wave 1-4 High findings are closed; PoC tests added; full backend test
suite green; helm chart lints clean.
Wave 1 - Auth & identity
- C1 OAuth state nonce: PutOAuthState / ConsumeOAuthState (valkey,
GETDEL single-use, 15min TTL); Callback rejects missing/forged/cross-
provider state before token exchange.
- C2 OAuth identity linking: refuse silent linking to existing user
unless info.EmailVerified is true. fetchGitHubUser now consults the
/user/emails endpoint for the verified flag (no more hardcoded true);
fetchFacebookUser sets EmailVerified=false (FB exposes no per-email
verification flag).
- H1 Magic-link verify: replaced Get + MarkUsed with a single atomic
UPDATE...RETURNING (ConsumeMagicLink) - TOCTOU-free.
- H2 TOTP code replay: MarkTOTPCodeConsumed (valkey SET NX, 120s TTL)
prevents replay of a successfully validated code; fails closed on
transient store errors.
- H3 Backup-code orphan: DisableTOTP now also wipes totp_backup_codes.
Wave 2 - Middleware & network
- C3 CORS/CSRF regex anchoring: NewCORSConfig wraps each pattern with
\A...\z so substring spoofing of origins is impossible.
- H4 ClientIP: server reads APP_TRUSTED_PROXIES; gin SetTrustedProxies
is called explicitly (empty default = no proxy trust).
- H11 Body limit + DisallowUnknownFields: BodyLimitBytes middleware
(1 MiB default) wraps every request; validate.BindJSON now uses a
json.Decoder with DisallowUnknownFields and rejects trailing tokens;
413 envelope on body-limit overflow.
- H16 NetworkPolicy: backend.networkPolicy.enabled defaults to true;
new web-networkpolicy.yaml restricts web pod ingress to nginx-gateway
and egress to backend service + DNS + 443.
Wave 3 - Encryption at rest
- C4 TOTP secrets: CreateTOTPSecret writes encrypted secret_v2;
GetTOTPSecret prefers v2 with legacy fallback.
- C5 OAuth tokens: migration 000033 adds *_v2 columns; CreateOAuthAccount
and UpdateOAuthTokens write encrypted; GetOAuthAccount reads v2 with
legacy fallback.
- M1 Domain separation: crypto.DeriveKeyFor(secret, purpose) replaces
single-purpose DeriveKey; settings, totp, oauth each use a distinct
HKDF-derived subkey. DeriveKey kept as back-compat alias for settings.
Wave 4 - Input & AI safety
- C6 SSRF: new pkg/safehttp refuses to dial RFC1918, loopback, link-
local, ULA, multicast, unspecified, or cloud-metadata IPs; scheme
allowlist (http/https). Wired into pkg/scrape, discovery LinkChecker,
and imageURLReachable. NewForTesting opt-in for httptest.
- H13 PromptGuard German + Unicode: NFKC + Cf-class strip pre-pass
closes zero-width and full-width-homoglyph bypasses; new German rules
for ignoriere/missachte/vergiss/role-escalation/prompt-exfil/verbatim;
Gemma-style and pipe-delimited chat-template tokens covered;
source-fence rule prevents '=== Quelle:' splice in scraped text.
- H14 BudgetGate: new ai.BudgetGate interface; UsageRepo.CheckBudget
reads today's SUM(estimated_cost_usd) (10s cache) and refuses calls
when AI_DAILY_CAP_USD is exceeded; GeminiProvider.Chat checks the
gate before contacting Gemini.
OAuth routes remain disabled in server/routes.go, so C1/C2 are not
actively reachable today; fixes ensure correctness when re-enabled.
vikingowl
5821547a73